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ECONOMIC INEQUALITY AND THE ROLE 
OF LAW 
Richard L. Kaplan* 
WEALTH AND DEMOCRACY: A POLITICAL HISTORY OF THE 
AMERICAN RICH. By Kevin Phillips. New York: Broadway Books. 
2002. Pp. xxii, 473. $29.95. 
In this ambitious book, famed commentator and analyst Kevin 
Phillips attempts nothing less than a political history of American eco­
nomic life with a specific focus on the wealthy. Succeeding far more 
often than not, Phillips interweaves the development of American 
technology with the rise and fall of economic fortunes, crafting a 
compelling tale with significant implications for the formulation of 
public policy and the laws that implement such policy. 
Festooned with more than seventy charts and graphs, the book 
explains how wealth has been accumulated throughout the entire 
history of the United States. It is full of intriguing insights and 
demands serious consideration of its message and warnings. For 
example, one of the book's persistent themes is that concentration of 
economic power inevitably corrupts the political process - a point 
dramatized in recent debates about campaign finance, including the 
valiant efforts of Senator John McCain and former Senator Bill 
Bradley in the most recent presidential-election campaign. But Phillips 
goes further to show how the political process, thus corrupted, spews 
forth public policies that protect its patrons, often at the expense of 
the masses whose votes theoretically sustain that process. 
Even more important, Phillips shows how the economic concentra­
tion that corrupts the political process came about - namely, through 
exploiting public policies for private gain. As he states with unflinch­
ing clarity: "Laissez-faire is a pretense. Government power and 
preferment have been used by the rich, not shunned" (p. xiv). 
At this point, a brief biographical note about Mr. Phillips is essen­
tial. A self-described Republican, he was the chief political analyst to 
Richard Nixon's successful presidential campaign in 1968. One can 
begin to appreciate how much the American political landscape has 
changed since that time from his reference to President Nixon's 
support for national health insurance and "income maintenance for 
the poor" (p. viii). Such positions today might jeopardize his standing 
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in the Democratic party, let alone the Republican party! The political 
evolution of this transformation and its implications for various legal 
regimes are the focus of this commentary. 
I. RISING ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 
In recent years, there has been a growing awareness that the gap 
between rich and poor in America is increasing.1 Whether measured in 
terms of annual income, percentage of financial assets owned, or the 
earnings of corporate executives compared to ordinary workers, the 
incontrovertible evidence shows that more and more economic 
resources are controlled by fewer and fewer people. One study 
revealed that the percentage of total household wealth held by the top 
one percent of families grew from twenty percent in 1976 to over forty 
percent in 1997 (p. 123). Another report found that ninety percent of 
the top quintile's increase in wealth accrued to just the top one per­
cent (p. xiii). Phillips arranges his charts and stories with devastating 
effect: the very rich really are getting richer, and almost everyone else 
is either stagnating or declining. What Phillips adds to this discussion, 
however, is historical perspective and insightful explanation of the 
forces that produced this unparalleled concentration of income and 
wealth. 
In Chapter One, for example, he examines how wealth was created 
during the early centuries of our country's existence. He explicates the 
role of inheritance laws by showing that for the richest families of 1828 
to 1848, the surest path to wealth was to have rich parents (p. 23). The 
later rise of the so-called "robber barons" is then chronicled, though a 
fascinating comparison of the wealthiest household's assets to median 
household wealth shows that the storied accumulations of Cornelius 
Vanderbilt, Jean Paul Getty, and even John D. Rockefeller pale by 
comparison to that of Bill Gates today (p. 38). 
The book examines the twentieth century in great detail, from the 
growth of the oil and steel fortunes in the Progressive Era (pp. 49-54), 
through the Great Depression, World War II, and subsequent events. 
Of particular interest to today, of course, is what Phillips describes as 
the "Great Technology Mania" of the 1990s (p. 98). It was during this 
period that economic inequality grew beyond all previous patterns. In 
1999, for example, "'the richest 2.7 million Americans, the top 1 per-
1. See, e.g., BRUCE ACKERMAN & ANNE ALSTOTT, THE STAKEHOLDER SOCIETY 
(1999); James R. Repetti, Democracy, Taxes, and Wealth, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 825 (2001); see 
also Koen Caminada & Kees Goudswaard, International Trends in Income Inequality and 
Social Policy, 8 INT'L TAX & PUB. FIN. 395 (2001); Ray Bashara, The $6,000 Solution, 
ATLANTIC MONTHLY, Jan./Feb. 2003, at 91 ;  Orlando Patterson, Beyond Compassion, 
DAEDALUS, Winter 2002, at 26; Sean Wilenz, America's Lost Egalitarian Tradition, 
DAEDALUS, Winter 2002, at 66. See generally Christopher Jencks, Does Inequality Matter?, 
DAEDALUS, Winter 2002, at 49. 
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cent, will have as many after-tax dollars to spend as the bottom 100 
million' " (p. 103). The then-raging stock market was a major factor: 
"Of the stock market gains between 1989 and 1997, some 86 percent 
flowed to the top 10 percent of households. Slightly over 42 percent 
went to the top 1 percent alone" (p. 107). 
One of Phillips's most important insights regards the active role of 
public policy in fostering and maintaining this concentration of wealth. 
One fascinating chart (pp. 105-06) details the "financial bailouts" 
during 1980-2000 from the Federal Reserve Board, the U.S. Treasury 
Department, and various instrumentalities - like the Resolution 
Trust Corporation for beleaguered savings and loan companies - that 
were created in response to specific financial calamities. Clearly, the 
resulting accumulation of wealth during this period had as much to do 
with dependence on government largesse as it did on rugged individu­
alism or other nostrums of a merit-based culture centered on risks and 
rewards. 
Phillips proceeds to demolish one major myth of our political 
economy after another. Far from President John F. Kennedy's hope 
that "a rising tide lifts all boats," recent U.S. history suggests that the 
past quarter-century of economic activity bestowed its benefits on only 
certain boats, specifically on yachts. Thus, after-tax income during 
1977-1994 actually declined for the lower three quintiles and increased 
by only four percent for the next-to-the-highest quintile (p. 137). The 
real growth was at the top. Even within the top quintile, income 
growth was skewed to the highest ranked, with the top one percent 
seeing an increase in after-tax income of seventy-two percent (p. 137). 
Similarly, despite all the press about America becoming a nation of 
stockholders, ninety percent of all shares are held by the top ten 
percent of households (p. 142). 
These statistics actually disguise the true fate of America's middle 
class during this period, which is grimmer than has been generally 
acknowledged. Phillips points out that middle-class families have 
maintained their levels of economic well-being only by "sen[ ding] new 
waves of women into the labor markets" (p. 113). As a result, the 
United States now has "the world's highest ratio of two-income 
households, with its hidden, de facto tax on time and families" (p. 
113). Further comparisons with other Western industrialized countries 
make the United. States look even worse: "[T]he typical American 
worked 350 hours more per year than the typical European, the 
equivalent of nine work weeks" (p. 113). And for what? American 
wage earners have "less pension and health coverage as well as . . .  the 
Industrial West's least amount of vacation time, shortest maternity 
leaves, and shortest average notice of termination" (p. 113; emphasis 
added). 
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This point bears further underscoring. Almost half of American 
workers have no pension coverage beyond Social Security. 2 When I 
served as a delegate to the National Summit on Retirement Savings3 
last year, I observed that most of the discussion focused on getting 
Americans to save more for their retirement. Administration officials 
enthused about recently enacted legislation that increased the amount 
that could be saved through various tax-favored savings vehicles, such 
as so-called 401(k) plans, individual retirement accounts, and the like. 4 
But these arrangements miss the essential point that U.S. employers 
have increasingly reduced their funding of employees' retirement, 5 
deferring instead to these voluntary options. 
The situation with health-care coverage is even worse. Phillips 
points out that "only 26 percent of employees in the bottom 10 
percent had health insurance provided by their companies" (p. 133). 
Indeed, eighty-four percent of Americans without health insurance are 
in families with at least one employed person6 - a situation with no 
counterpart in any other industrialized democracy. President Bill 
Clinton tried to address this situation in 1993,7 but that effort was 
defeated ignominiously.8 Indeed, some commentators attribute the 
loss of the Congress by Democrats in 1994, in part, to this attempt at 
fundamental health-care reform.9 And this episode occurred during 
one of the greatest expansions of the U.S. economy! Apparently, a 
rising tide does not lift all boats. 
2. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO 
EMPLOYER-SPONSORED DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS (JCX-71-02, 2002), at 28 (stating that 
fifty-six percent of full-time private-sector employees have an employer-sponsored pension 
plan). There are significant variations in pension plan coverage among racial groups. See 
Yung-Ping Chen & Thomas D. Leavitt, The Widening Gap Between White and Minority 
Pension Coverage, in PUBLIC POLICY AND AGING 82 (2001). Gender differences, in contrast, 
are virtually nonexistent. See Craig Copeland, Pension Coverage: Examining CPS Data, 
EBRI NOTES, Sept. 2000, at 1 .  
3. This conference of  experts on retirement savings was convened pursuant to 29 U.S_.C. 
§ 1 147 (2000). 
4. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, §§ 
601(a), 61 1 (d)(l), (e)(2), (f)(2), 115 Stat. 38, 94, 97-99 (amending I.RC. §§ 219 (b)(5), 
402(g)(l), 457(e)(15), 408(p)(2) (1986); codified as amended in scattered sections of l.R.C.). 
5. See Dallas L. Salisbury, Current and Emerging Trends in Employee Benefits,. in 
PUBLIC POLICY AND AGING, supra note 2, at 60. 
6. PAUL FRONSTIN, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RES. INST., BRIEF NO. 252, SOURCES OF 
HEALTH INSURANCE AND. CHARACTERISTICS OF THE UNINSURED: ANALYSIS OF THE 
MARCH 2002 CURRENT POPULATION SURVEY 11 (2002) (finding that four out of five 
nonelderly persons with health insurance have employment-based coverage). 
7. See Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, S. 1757, 103d Cong.§ 1001 (1993). 
8. See generally THEDA SKOCPOL, BOOMERANG: CLINTON'S HEALTH SECURITY 
EFFORT AND THE TURN AGAINST GOVERNMENT JN U.S. POLITICS (1996). 
9. See MICHAEL J. GRAETZ & JERRY L. MASHAW, TRUE SECURITY: RETHINKING 
AMERICAN SOCIAL INSURANCE 130 (1999). 
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Phillips goes on, in an extremely important segment, to rebut the 
claim that the U.S. situation has a silver lining in the form of lower 
unemployment (p. 164). This oft-repeated assertion ignores the 
estimates of up to six million workers who have lost their jobs but who 
no longer seek employment due to depression, lack cif qualifications, 
and similar reasons. Including this cohort in the ranks of the 
unemployed boosts the U.S. unemployment rate to European levels, 
but without the social-services support that accompanies such high 
unemployment levels overseas (pp. 165, 345). 
Phillips then explores the role of governmental policies in shaping 
these developments. Phillips demonstrates that industry by industry -
from railroads to radio, from electricity to aircraft, through biotech­
nology and the Internet - governmental policies on taxation, 
franchises and charters, banking, trade regulation, and research 
funding have played major roles in the creation of vast personal 
fortunes and concentrated wealth (pp. 214-48, 294). . . 
The process then comes full circle when those fortunes are used to 
finance political campaigns and determine future governmental 
policies. Phillips traces this cycle adroitly, providing several gems 
along the way. For example, a compilation of "shared characteristics" 
of the Gilded Age of the 1870s, the 1920s, and the 1980-1999 period 
include the following: 
1. Conservative politics and ideology . . . .  
2. Skepticism of government - from laissez-faire to program cuts and 
deregulation - and emphasis on markets and the private sector. . . .  
4. Replacement of public interest politics by private interest politics, 
with high levels of corruption .. . .  
7. Major economic and corporate restructuring - repeating merger 
waves . . .  leveraged buy-outs, spin-offs et al. . . .  
11. Concentration of wealth, economic polarization, and rising levels of 
inequality. (p. 297) 
Other gems pertain directly to campaign finance: "Large individual 
donors" were the single-largest source of money in the 2000 federal 
election (p. 324); three-quarters of all funds contributed by individuals 
came from donors in the top one to one-and-one-half percent of 
income earners (p. 326). 
The rationale for, and result of, this bizarre arrangement is best 
illustrated in a satirical - but accurate - advertisement on the web­
site of billionairesforbushorgore.com: 
While you may be familiar with stocks and bonds, currency specula­
tion, IPOs and all the rest, there's a new investment arena you should be 
aware of: legislation. ... 
. . . Don't worry, it's completely legal. With the help of a professional 
legislation broker (called a Lobbyist), you place your investment (called 
1992 Michigan Law Review [Vol. 101:1987 
a Campaign Contribution) with a carefully selected list of legislation 
manufacturers (called Members of Congress). These manufacturers then 
go to work, crafting industry-specific subsidies, inserting tax breaks into 
the code, extending patents or giving away public property for free. 
Just check out these results. The Timber Industry spent $8 million in 
campaign contributions to preserve the logging road subsidy, worth $458 
million-the return on their investment was 5,725%. Glaxo Wellcome 
invested $1.2 million in campaign contributions to get a 19-month patent 
extension on Zantac worth $1 billion-their net return: $83,333%. The 
Tobacco Industry spent $30 million in contributions for a tax break 
worth $50 billion-the return on their investment: 167,000%. For a paltry 
$5 million in campaign contributions, the Broadcasting Industry was able 
to secure free digital TV licenses, a give-away of public property worth 
$70 billion-that's an incredible 1,400,000% return on their investment. 
(p. 326) 
As this posting suggests, concentrated wealth is able to distort 
democratic processes for private enrichment, and the amazing aspect 
of this arrangement is not that public policy is for sale, but rather how 
cheaply it can be bought! 
Among the important myths that Phillips explodes is that the last 
two decades of American history have been unique. To the contrary, 
he shows that speculative fever has a long pattern of occurrence and 
that the end result each time is more concentration of economic 
opportunity, not less (pp. 366-68). Furthermore, the so-called "democ­
ratization" of finance in the age of personal computers had surpris­
ingly little net impact.10 To be sure, the Internet enabled ordinary 
Americans to access economic data that was previously the exclusive 
province of financial elites. And electronic day trading by everyone 
from teenage truants to Barbara Streisand meant that people were no 
longer restricted to conventional channels of amassing wealth. 
But the end results were largely unchanged. Millions of Americans 
followed the stock markets, but it profited them not. One study found 
"that 71 percent of families individually owned no shares or held less 
than $2,000 worth" (p. 362). Phillips displays a devastating series of six 
graphs taken from Barron's magazine but arranges them with the 
following captions that he wrote: 
1) As the stock indexes soared, pumped up by stockbrokers and analysts 
2) the price-to-earnings ratio of Nasdaq stocks left sober precedent far 
behind 
3) dwarfing even the excesses of the late 1920's 
4) as householders who had abandoned stocks . . .  were lured back in 
10. Pun intended. 
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5) . . .  by putting their money in equities [and] by taking on record levels 
of margin debt 
6) while the insiders sold out . . . .  (p. 363) 
The bottom line: "The history of the United States, in short, is full of 
money and wealth-related democratizations . . . .  But . . .  they have 
not, for more than brief periods or wave crests, notably changed the 
concentration of wealth in general or the concentration of financial 
assets in the hands of the top 1 percent" (p. 368). This is an important 
reality that Americans have not yet begun to comprehend. 
II. THE ROLE OF LAW 
What, then, should law do about this dismal situation? That is 
where Phillips is notably deficient. He devotes a scant five pages to the 
U.S. tax system (pp. 218-23), and virtually ignores the one tax directed 
at accumulations of wealth - namely, the federal estate tax. Nor does 
he more than casually mention the . Social Security statutes or 
Medicare laws, both of which have enormous potential for ameliorat­
ing income disparities of the sort that Phillips documents so compel­
lingly. To be sure, at the very end of the book he notes that "high 
taxes on the assets, incomes, or consumption patterns of the rich - or 
all three - could be used in the twenty-first century to fund the late 
twentieth-century promises of entitlements like Social Security and 
Medicare" (p. 422). At that point, he also makes an oblique reference 
to inheritance taxation as a tool "to diminish wealth concentration" (p. 
422). But no specifics are offered, no current proposals are considered, 
and no substantive comment is offered on the tax legislation enacted 
in June 2001,11 even though the book was not completed until January 
of 2002 (p. viii). 
This Part takes Phillips's critique seriously and considers various 
legal developments from the standpoint of their likely impact on 
America's economic inequality. This analysis begins with the tax 
legislation previously mentioned and proceeds to health care and 
Social Security. 
A. Tax Act of 2001 
The first major legislative enactment of the new Bush 
Administration was the so-called Economic Growth and Tax Relief 
Reconciliation Act of 2001 ("2001 Tax Act").1 2 Its myriad provisions 
may yet have some impact on "economic growth," but they have 
1 1 .  Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 1 07-16, 
115 Stat. 38 (codified as amended in scattered sections of l.R.C.). 
12. Id. 
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already provided "tax relief" to millions of American taxpayers. In 
terms of addressing economic inequality, however, this legislation 
could hardly have been more poorly designed. This Section focuses on 
only three of its major provisions - namely, those with the greatest 
impact on the issues addressed in Wea/th and Democracy. 
1. Estate Tax Repeal 
No part of the 2001 Tax Act better encapsulates the insouciance 
with which its proponents regard Phillips's concerns than the repeal of 
the federal estate tax.1 3 To be sure, repeal does not take place until the 
year 2010 and then for only one year,1 4 but those qualifications were 
required by congressional budgetary constraints. The law's message is 
clear nonetheless: the federal estate tax is irredeemably offensive to 
the notion that wealth should be accumulated and transferred to 
succeeding generations without governmental interference of any 
kind. 
Although the estate tax has not been a terribly effective deterrent 
to dynastic accumulations of wealth, it makes an effort in that direc­
tion. Thus, it falls only on estates of fewer than two percent of 
decedents.1 5 Moreover, that limited level of coverage was before the 
estate-tax exemption was increased by forty-eight percent, to one 
million dollars, in 2002.1 6 This substantial increase was possible fiscally 
because the resulting revenue loss was relatively small, further 
testament to the extraordinary concentration of wealth in America 
that Phillips documents in his book. The real money is in large estates: 
in fact, more than half of the revenue generated by the estate tax 
comes from estates of more than five million dollars,1 7 even though 
they represent a tiny fraction of decedents. 
In any case, the estate tax has never been as onerous an exaction as 
its opponents have contended. Annual gifts of eleven thousand dollars 
13. l.R.C. § 2210 (2000) (codifying§ 501(a) of the 2001 Tax Act). See generally Sanford 
J. Schlesinger & Dana L. Mark, The Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 
2001: Title V, J .  RETIREMENT PLAN., July-Aug. 2001, at 42. 
14. l.R.C. § 2210(a) (2000) (added by Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation 
Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 501(a), 1 15  Stat. 38, 69) (repeal after 2009); id. at§ 901(a), 
1 15 Stat. at 150 (reinstatement after 2010). 
15. See Jacob M. Schlesinger & Nicholas Kulish, Will Power: As Paper Millionaires 
Multiply, Estate Tax Takes a Public Beating - The Long Economic Boom Eases Many Mis­
givings About Inherited Wealth - Gates Trumps Rockefellers, WALL ST. J. , July 13, 2000, at 
Al. 
16. l.R.C. § 2010(c) (2000) (estate tax exemption of $675,000); id., amended by Eco­
nomic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 521 ,  115 
Stat. 38, 71 (exemption of $1,000,000 in 2003). 
17. Computation done by author using data in Lynn Asinof, Heirs' Gains May Mean 
Losses for 'Avoidance' Industries, WALL ST. J. , Feb. 26, 2001 , at Cl. 
May 2003] Economic Inequality and Law 1995 
per beneficiary can reduce a person's taxable estate considerably. 18 
And if the property owner is married, 19 she may double these amounts 
each year - again per beneficiary - with zero tax consequences. 
Furthermore, any amount left to a surviving spouse bears no estate tax 
whatsoever, regardless of amount. 20 This generous provision, which 
would enable Bill Gates to leave all of his billions to his wife Melinda 
without owing any estate tax, is not a new tax gimmick - it has been 
the law since 1981. 2 1  
Other provisions also existed prior to 2001 that dramatically re­
duce, if not eliminate, the estate tax on family businesses and farms. 2 2  
For example, estate taxes due can be paid over a period of fourteen 
years, with interest-only payments for the first four years. 23 This is 
hardly the sort of calamity portrayed by the estate-tax repealers when 
they cry that "you shouldn't have to meet the undertaker and the tax­
man on the same day." Even in 1977, Professor George Cooper 
described the estate tax as a "voluntary tax," because it had so many 
escape hatches and acknowledged loopholes. 2 4  Nonetheless, oppo­
nents of the estate tax successfully engineered its repeal in 2001 and 
continue their efforts to make this repeal permanent. 2 5  
As I have indicated elsewhere, 26 the estate tax was vulnerable to 
attack because its exemption amount had not kept up with the growth 
of the U.S. economy. Perhaps an exemption of nine million dollars -
the approximate relative value of the estate tax's original exemption 
18. I.RC. § 2503(b)(l) (2000), amended by Rev. Proc. 2002-70, 2002-46 I.RB. 845, § 
3.24. 
1 9. I.RC. § 2513(a)(l) (2000). See generally DAVID WESTFALL & GEORGE P. MAIR, 
ESTATE PLANNING LAW AND TAXATION 'II 9.04[2J[a][ii] (4th ed. 2001). 
20. I.RC. § 2056(a) (2000). 
21. Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 403(a), 95 Stat. 301 (codi­
fied as amended at I.RC.§ 2056(a) (2000)). 
22. See I.RC. §§ 2032A, 2057 (2000) (stating special valuation rules for farms and busi­
ness real estate and special deduction fot "qualified family-owned business interests"). 
23. See I.RC.§ 6166(a) (2000). This payment schedule applies if at least thirty-five per­
cent of an estate's value consists of closely held business interests.§ 6166 (a)(l), (b)(l). Oth­
erwise, the estate tax is due nine months after the decedent's death. § 6075(a). See generally 
WESTFALL & MAIR, supra note 19, at '!17.04. 
24. George Cooper, A Voluntary Tax? New Perspectives on Sophisticated Estate Tax 
Avoidance, 77 COLUM. L. REV. 161, 161 (1977); see also William M. VanDenburgh & Philip 
J. Harmelink, Estate Tax Planning Implications After the 2002 Mid-Term Elections, TAXES, 
Jan. 2003, at 53, 56 ("Currently, through a variety of devices, extremely large estates (say 
$50-100 million or more) can effectively plan around estate taxes."). 
25. See Permanent Death Tax Repeal Act of 2002, H.R 2143, 1 07th Cong. (2002). 
26. Richard L. Kaplan, Crowding Out: Estate Tax Reform and the Elder Law Policy 
Agenda, 10 ELDER L.J. 15 (2002). 
. 
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amount27 - would have forestalled the repeal effort, but perhaps not. 
This repeal effort, after all, is a perfect example of what Phillips 
describes as the interaction of concentrated wealth and democratic 
processes: a tax that is imposed on the very wealthiest of decedents is 
targeted for repeal, because that is the same segment of the popula­
tion that provides the bulk of political campaign financing. And both 
major political parties joined in the repeal effort, because they feed at 
the same campaign financing trough, validating Ralph Nader's pithy 
characterization that the Democratic and Republican parties " 'have 
morphed together into one corporate party with two heads wearing 
different make-up' " (p. 320). 
2. Retirement Savings Incentives 
The 2001 Tax Act increased the amount that working Americans 
can contribute to special tax-favored savings accounts that are 
intended to fund their retirement.28 Elsewhere,29 I analyzed the most 
ubiquitous of these arrangements - the individual retirement 
account, or IRA30 - and concluded that major structural defects exist 
that mitigate against its presumed role in providing retirement income 
to retired Americans. But there is no doubt that these accounts repre­
sent attractive vehicles for channeling retirement-oriented savings. By 
boosting the maximum contribution thresholds,3 1  therefore, the 2001 
Tax Act seems to empower nonwealthy Americans to accumulate 
wealth for themselves, no? 
27. Id. at 20 (citing GARY ROBBINS & ALDONA ROBBINS, INST. FOR POLICY 
INNOVATION, THE CASE FOR BURYING THE ESTATE TAX 8 (1999) (finding that the 
equivalent amount in 1998 was $8,845,267)). 
28. See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001 , Pub. L. No. 107-
16, §§ 601(a), 611 (d)(1), (e)(2), (f)(2), 115 Stat. 38, 94, 97-99 (amending I.RC.§§ 219 (b)(5), 
402(g)(l), 457(e)(15), 408(p)(2) (1986)). The maximum contribution limits are increased 
according to different schedules for the various types of retirement-oriented accounts as 
follows: 
Individual Salar� Reduction Plans 
Retirement Under§ 401(k), 
Year Accounts § 403(b), § 457 SIMPLE 
2002 $3,000 $11,000 $7,000 
2003 $3,000 $12,000 $8,000 
2004 $3,000 $13,000 $9,000 
2005 $4,000 $14,000 $10,000 
2006 $4,000 $15,000 Indexed 
2007 $4,000 Indexed Indexed 
2008 $5,000 Indexed Indexed 
29. Richard L. Kaplan, Retirement Funding and the Curious Evolution of Individual 
Retirement Accounts, 7 ELDER L.J. 283 (1999). 
30. I.R.C. § 408 (2000). 
31. See supra note 28. 
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The ugly truth is that most eligible taxpayers were not contributing 
the maximum allowable before the law was changed. Indeed, one 
study by the U.S. Treasury Department's Office of Tax Analysis 
revealed that only four percent of eligible taxpayers contributed the 
maximum amount of two thousand dollars to their IRAs.3 2 Who, then, 
is likely to benefit as this threshold was raised to three thousand 
dollars in 2002, on its way up to five thousand dollars in 2008?33 
Obviously, only that elite group of IRA contributors who were 
contributing the maximum amount previously, and probably only a 
portion of that group, in fact. 
The reasons for this lack of broader utilization of retirement 
savings vehicles are varied, and these reasons are not confined to 
IRAs. For example, even when employers set up retirement savings 
plans at work - typically, 401(k) plans - and arrange for automatic 
payroll deductions to fund these accounts, many employees do not 
participate,34 or fail to fund their accounts to the maximum allowed 
prior to the 2001 Tax Act.35 And if an employee did not put ten 
thousand five hundred dollars36 into her 401(k) plan in 2001, will she 
really put twelve thousand dollars into her plan in 2003?37 Get real! 
The move to increase retirement savings plan limits, moreover, 
ignored the biggest impediment to full funding of these accounts -
namely, the stagnating incomes of the nonwealthy, one of the major 
themes in Phillips's book. An analysis by the Congressional Budget 
Office in 2001 revealed that after-tax income in inflation-adjusted 
32. See PETER ORSZAG & JONATHAN ORSZAG, WOULD RAISING IRA CONTRIBUTION 
LIMITS BOLSTER RETIREMENT SECURITY FOR LOWER- AND MIDDLE-INCOME FAMILIES 
OR Is THERE A BETTER WAY?, 2000 CENTER ON BUDGET & POLICY PRIORITIES 1 (citing 
ROBERT CARROLL, OFFICE OF TAX ANALYSIS, U.S. DEP'T OF THE TREASURY, IRAS AND 
THE TAX REFORM ACT OF 1997 (Jan. 2000)), available at http://www.cbpp.org/4-12-
00tax2.pdf; see also U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GA0-01-846, PRIVATE PENSIONS: 
ISSUES OF COVERAGE AND INCREASING CONTRIBUTION LIMITS FOR DEFINED 
CONTRIBUTION PLANS 14-15 (2001) (stating that approximately eight percent of pension 
plan participants would benefit from increased contribution limits). 
33. l.R.C. § 219(b)(5)(A) (2000), amended by Economic Growth and Tax Relief Recon­
ciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 601(a), 1 15 Stat. 38, 94. 
34. See David Joulfaian & David Richardson, Who Takes Advantage of Tax-Deferred 
Saving Programs? Evidence from Federal Income Tax Data, 54 NAT'L TAX J. 669 (2001). 
35. See U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAO/HEHS-98-5, 401(K) PENSION PLANS: 
LOAN PROVISIONS ENHANCE PARTICIPATION BUT MAY AFFECT INCOME SECURITY FOR 
SOME 3 (1997) (finding an average contribution rate of 7% of salary). During the survey pe­
riod, the maximum contribution rate was 20%. EMJAY CORP., 401(K) ANSWER BOOK 8-14 
(2000); see also SARAH HOLDEN & JACK VANDERHEI, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RESEARCH 
INST., BRIEF NO. 238, CONTRIBUTION BEHAVIOR OF 401(K) PLAN PARTICIPANTS (2001) 
(finding a 6.8% contribution rate using 1999 data); David Cay Johnson, 401 (k) Changes Go 
Unheeded, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 19, 2001, at C18 (reporting that only 1 1% of 401(k) participants 
made the maximum allowable contribution in 1999). 
36. I.R.S. Notice 2000-66, 2000-2 C.B. 600. 
37. I.R.C. § 402(g)(l)(A) (2000), amended by Economic Growth and Tax Relief Recon­
ciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 61l(d)(l), 1 1 5  Stat. 38, 97-98. 
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dollars had actually declined for the lowest twenty percent of U.S. 
households from 1979 to 1997, and that the middle quintile had an 
increase of less than five percent over this period, to slightly more than 
thirty-three thousand dollars (p. 396). By contrast, income of the top 
one percent had increased by more than two hundred and fifty percent 
(p. 396). For most Americans, in other words, increasing the limits on 
retirement savings contributions is an empty gesture. They simply 
cannot afford to set aside even the old limit! 
Even worse, legislation boosting retirement-account limits distracts 
attention from a fundamental source of economic inequality -
namely, the lack of employer-provided pension coverage for an 
increasing proportion of nonwealthy Americans.38 First, the profes­
sionally managed "defined benefit" pension plan was phased out in 
favor of "defined contribution" plans39 that put all of the control -
and all of the risk of investment failure - into the hands of individual 
employees.40 Then, the "defined contribution" plan morphed into 
salary reduction plans - 401(k)s, 403(b), 457, and the like - to which 
employers provided only matching contributions, 41 and often not even 
that.4 2 The increased risk of these plans was then augmented most 
dangerously when employer stock became their principal investment, 
as is often the case, 43 even after the Enron debacle and similar 
calamities. 
The end result of these changes is that the retirement income of 
nonwealthy Americans is more precarious than ever before. The wide­
spread decimation of 401(k) plans has only recently awakened most 
Americans to the very real dangers that these plans present. And what 
is the Bush Administration's response? Revise pension laws to 
encourage defined benefit plans? Mandate matching contributions to 
salary-reduction arrangements? Limit or restrict employer stock in 
401(k) plans? Try boosting the amount that the wealthiest employees 
38. See Richard L. Kaplan, Enron, Pension Policy and Social Security Privatization, 46 
ARIZ. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004). 
39. See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, PRESENT LAW AND BACKGROUND RELATING TO 
EMPLOYER-SPONSORED DEFINED BENEFIT PLANS (JCX-71-02, 2002), at 31; see also CRAIG 
COPLAND & JACK VANDERHEI, EMPLOYEE BENEFIT RES. INST., BRIEF NO. 223, 
PERSONAL ACCOUNT RETIREMENT PLANS: AN ANALYSIS OF THE SURVEY OF CONSUMER 
FINANCES 7-8 (2000). 
40. See LAWRENCE A. FROLIK & RICHARD L. KAPLAN, ELDER LAW IN A NUTSHELL 
357 (3d ed. 2003). 
· 
41. See EMJAY CORP., supra note 35, at 2-7 (stating that seventy-one percent of 401(k) 
plans surveyed have matching contributions). 
42. See CINDY HOUNSELL ET AL., WOMEN'S INST. FOR A SECURE RETIREMENT, YOUR 
FUTURE PAYCHECK: WHAT WOMEN NEED TO KNOW ABOUT PAY, SOCIAL SECURITY, 
PENSIONS, SAVINGS AND INVESTMENTS 26 (2002); EMJAY CORP., supra note 35, at 2-7. 
43. See Daniel Kadlec, Time Bomh: 401 (k)s Stuffed With Employer Stock Are a National 
Calamity, TIME, Mar. 5, 2001, at 84; Ellen E. Schultz, Employers Fight Limits on Firm's 
Stock in 40/(k)s, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21, 2001, at Cl. 
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may contribute to their retirement accounts. A good idea for those 
employees, .to be sure, but one that can only exacerbate the economic 
inequality that retirement plans currently represent. 
3. Education Incentives 
The 2001 Tax Act created several distinct incentives for funding 
the costs of higher education, but most of these provisions are of 
limited significance.44 For example, the maximum contribution to a 
Coverdell Education Savings Account was increased from five 
hundred dollars to two thousand dollars per year.45 Nice, but not likely 
to have a serious impact on the disparity in economic resources facing 
the next generation of college attendees. 
One change, however, has far greater significance: the complete 
exemption of certain college-savings plans from federal income 
taxation.46 These plans, colloquially styled 529 plans because of the 
Internal Revenue Code section that sets forth their essential features, 
enable taxpayers to set up special accounts for college tuition as well 
as the related room and board expenses.47 The plans are nominally 
fashioned by state law, so the specifics vary among jurisdictions.48 But 
their most fundamental appeal is a function of federal law: all invest­
ment income and capital gains derived by the plans are exempt from 
federal income tax, if the funds are used for the costs of higher 
education.49 In addition, there is typically no time limit during which 
the funds must be so used, unlike Coverdell Education Savings 
Accounts, which require distributions by the time the named benefici­
ary reaches thirty years of age.50 
These accounts existed prior to 2001, but they lacked tax exemp­
tion. Instead, the income tax was deferred until the student applied the 
funds towards college expenses, and then the tax was imposed at the 
student's presumably low income-tax rate.51 This arrangement was 
44. See generally Richard L. Kaplan, Funding a Grandchild's College Education, 1. 
RETIREMENT PLAN. , Sept.-Oct. 2001, at 15 [hereinafter Kaplan, Funding a Grandchild's 
College Education] . 
45. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 
40l(a)(l), 115 Stat. 38, 57 (amending I.RC.§ 530(b)(l)(A)(iii) (2000)). 
46. Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-16, § 
402(b)(l), 115 Stat. 38, 61 (amending I.RC.§ 529(c)(3)(B)(i) (2000)). 
47. See Kaplan, Funding a Grandchild's College Education, supra note 44, at 22. 
48. See http://www.savingforcollege.com (last visited Jan. 2, 2003) (offering state-by­
state compilation of available plans and their salient features). 
49. I.RC. § 529(c)(3)(B)(i) (West Supp. 2002). Many states exempt this income from 
their income taxes as well. See http://www.savingforcollege.com (last visited Jan. 2, 2003). 
50. See l.R.C. § 530(b)(l)(E) (2000) (treating any unused balance as distributed when 
the account beneficiary becomes thirty years old). 
51. See Kaplan, Funding a Grandchild's College Education, supra note 44, at 20-21. 
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certainly appealing, but the 2001 Tax Act made the deal that much 
sweeter by exempting the plans' investment income and profits 
from taxation entirely.5 2 As a result of this change, the investment 
companies that operate these plans went into advertising overdrive, 
and states that had not previously authorized such plans hastily did so. 
From the standpoint of economic inequality, which is the focus of 
Phillips's book, after all, why are these plans counterproductive? 
Simply because they allow wealthy taxpayers to move substantial sums 
off the tax rolls for the benefit of their privileged progeny. While 
states set the maximum amount that can be contributed to their 529 
plans, these limits often exceed a quarter of a million dollars per 
named beneficiary.53 While most plans have low mm1mum­
contribution levels,54 the real benefit is obtained by those who are able 
to fund these plans up to the maximum allowable by law. And at a 
time when access to higher education is increasingly becoming the 
ticket to economic opportunity,55 the complete tax exemption of 529 
plans exacerbates existing income and wealth inequalities and 
operates to perpetuate these disparities into succeeding generations. 
B. Health Care 
Fewer issues are more central to physical and financial well-being 
than health care, in particular who will pay for health-care expenses. 
For that reason, most modem societies provide some mechanism to 
ensure that health-care financing does not become a source of 
economic inequality. Not so the United States. Among the various 
aspects of this critical subject, this Section considers only two - health 
insurance and long-term care. 
1. Health Insurance 
Most health insurance in the United States is provided to 
nonelderly persons as a feature of their employment.56 But recent 
52. See Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-
16, § 402(b)(l), 115 Stat. 38, 61 (amending l.R.C. § 529(c)(3)(B)(i) (2000)). 
53. See http://www.savingforcollege.com (last visited Jan. 2, 2003) (stating that plans 
allowing contributions of $250,000 or more include those of Alabama, Alaska, Delaware, the 
District of Columbia, Florida, Nebraska, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Mexico, North 
Carolina, North Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, Utah, 
Virginia, and West Virginia). The limit in South Dakota is $305,000. Id. 
54. See http://www.savingforcollege.com (last visited Jan. 2, 2003) ($25-$50 per benefici­
ary, often less with automatic-contribution arrangements). 
55. See generally ACKERMAN & ALSTO'IT, supra note 1. 
56. FRONSTIN, supra note 6, at 4 (stating that four out of five nonelderly persons with 
health insurance have employment-based coverage). Older Americans generally receive 
health insurance through the federal government's Medicare program. See 42 U.S.C. § 
1395c(l) (2000). 
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trends, including the increasing use of "temporary" or part-time work­
ers that Phillips describes in his book (pp. 133, 164), have led to more 
Americans without health insurance.57 The legal response to this 
problem was the Health Security Act, proposed by President Bill 
Clinton in 1993.58 Although he artfully described Americans' plight as 
"one paycheck away from being uninsured," the vast majority of 
Americans had some sort of health insurance at the time and could 
not identify with those who had no such insurance.59 Collectively, they 
were comfortable with this fundamental economic inequality, even 
though the financial consequences of an uninsured illness or accident 
can be ruinous. The same impulse that tolerates a higher degree 
of economic inequality in this country than in any other Western 
democracy (pp. 123, 345-46) produced an attitude that can be summa­
rized as: "I've got mine; get yours." 
A very different American impulse created Medicare in 1965 to 
pay for the medical costs of older Americans.60 The potentially 
catastrophic costs of hospitalization have been essentially eliminated 
through this statutory regime.61 Medicare's coverage extends to almost 
all Americans age sixty-five and older, without regard to their specific 
economic resources.62 Medicare, therefore; has been a major factor in 
reducing the economic inequality of senior citizens with respect to 
health-care costs. But this communitarian impulse did not carry the 
day in 1993, and the Clinton health plan was unceremoniously dumped 
without even the courtesy of a recorded vote. 
Why was the response so different a generation earlier? For one 
thing, most people could identify with older Americans. They knew 
them personally and anticipated becoming older themselves some day. 
In contrast, most Americans did not know people without health 
insurance, or at least they did not know that they knew such persons, 
and they certainly did not anticipate - let alone desire - to join 
them. 
But another factor was afoot: a general disdain of government in 
all its forms, from taxation to social programs. This attitude was 
captured sardonically by President Clinton when he observed that 
"most of our folks think that the Government would mess up a two-
57. See FRONSTIN, supra note 6, at 8; see also Steven A. Schroeder, Prospects for 
Expanding Health Insurance Coverage, 344 NEW ENG. J. MED. 847, 847 (2001). 
58. See Health Security Act, H.R. 3600, S. 1757, 103d Cong.§ 1001 (1993). 
59. See David Blumenthal, Health Care Reform - Past and Future, 322 NEW ENG. J. 
MED. 465, 467 (1995). 
60. Social Security Amendments of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-97, 79 Stat. 286 (codified in 
scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). See generally FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 40, at 58-102. 
61. See FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 40, at 67-68. 
62. Id. at 58-63. 
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car parade."63 After a decade of President Reagan exhorting the 
citizenry that "government is not the solution, it is the problem," 
Americans collectively did not want to expand the reach of govern­
ment programs, even if the result was more economic inequality. 
2. Long-Term Care 
Another health-care issue that results in major economic 
dislocation and inequality is long-term care. As I explained else­
where,6 4 most older Americans have very limited coverage of long­
term care expenses via Medicare, even though the cost of such care 
can exceed one hundred thousand dollars per year in some areas.65 A 
small percentage of this vulnerable population have private long-term 
care insurance,66 but most are simply unprotected for such potentially 
cataclysmic expenditures. Only the wealthy can approach this issue 
with relative equanimity, but that is why this issue has not received 
any significant governmental attention: the rich can take care of them­
selves, so the issue is not on the government's radar screen. 
Yet, the cost of long-term care may become one of the defining 
sources of economic inequality as the wealth of the current generation 
of older Americans is passed along. For the poor, this issue is fairly 
benign, because their impoverishment, immediate or imminent, 
ensures their entry into the Medicaid program,67 with its coverage of 
long-term care costs.68 For those with more resources, however, long­
term care costs pose an enormous threat to the transfer of wealth 
between generations. These folks, with perhaps as much as one million 
dollars in financial assets and equity in their residence, have no 
exposure to the predations of the federal estate tax,69 but risk 
economic devastation from the costs of long-term care. In another 
context, I described this potential financial obligation as "a 100 
percent estate tax on the middle class!"70 
63. William J. Clinton, Remarks on the Reinventing Government Initiative, in 2 PUB. 
PAPERS 1543, 1544 (Sept. 14, 1994). 
64. Richard L. Kaplan, Financing Long-Term Care in the United States: Who Should Pay 
for Mom and Dad?, in AGING: CARING FOR OUR ELDERS 65 (David N. Weisstub et al. eds., 
2001) [hereinafter Kaplan, Financing Long-Term Care in the United States]. 
65. See PHYLLIS R. SHELTON, LONG-TERM CARE PLANNING GUIDE 1 (2000). 
66. U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, GAOff-HEHS-00-196, LONG-TERM CARE 
INSURANCE: BETTER INFORMATION CRITICAL TO PROSPECTIVE PURCHASERS - THE 
CONSUMER RESOURCE FOR LONG-TERM CARE FINANCING 3 (2000) (stating that fewer 
than ten percent of older Americans have long-term care insurance). 
67. See generally FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 40, at 106-12. 
68. Id. at 105-06. 
69. I.RC.§ 2010(c) (West Supp. 2002) (estate-tax exemption). 
70. See Kaplan, Financing Long-Term Care in the United States, supra note 64, at 70. 
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This source of economic inequality could be ameliorated if there 
was political interest in doing so. I examined this issue at length 
elsewhere71 and proposed that the Medicare statute be amended to 
liberalize its restrictions on coverage of nursing-home expenditures.72 I 
also suggested that private long-term care insurance be regulated73 
along the lines that were enacted in 1990 for so-called "Medigap" 
insurance.7 4 This change would standardize the available packages of 
benefits to minimize consumer confusion and facilitate the informed 
purchasing of this important coverage. Both approaches would reflect 
current medical practices and the new realities of extended life. 
A step in this direction was taken in 1996, but it was a very small 
step. Some basic consumer protections were enacted in that year's 
Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act.75 And the deus 
ex machina of tax deductibility was applied to premiums for long-term 
care insurance,76 but these tax benefits are usually more illusory than 
real. 77 While improvements to the tax treatment of these premiums 
have been proposed,78 they have not yet been adopted. Accordingly, 
long-term care remains an accident waiting to happen for most 
Americans, an unanticipated financial calamity when the need for 
such care arises. The longer this critical issue is not addressed, the 
more it perpetuates economic inequality as the gains of the 
nonwealthy are expended on the costs of long-term care. 
C. Social Security 
In terms of budgetary significance and societal impact, no statutory 
regime has more of an ameliorative effect on income inequality than 
Social Security. It provides monthly benefits, adjusted for inflation, to 
71. Richard L. Kaplan, Cracking the Conundrum: Toward a Rational Financing of Long-
Term Care, 2004 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2004). 
72. Id. 
73. Id. 
74. Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, § 4351(a)(3), 104 
Stat. 1388, 1388-126 (adding 42 U.S.C. § 1395ss(p) (2000)). See generally FROLIK & KAPLAN, 
supra note 40, at 90-96. 
75. See I.RC. § 7702B(b)(l)(C) (2000) (guaranteed renewability); § 7702B(g)(2)(A) 
(compliance with certain model Act and model regulation provisions);§ 7702B(g)(3) (disclo­
sure requirements);§ 7702B(g)(4) (nonforfeitability). 
76. I.RC. § 213(d)(l)(D) (2000) (added by Health Insurance Portability and Account­
ability Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-191, § 322(b)(l), 1 10 Stat. 1936, 2008). 
77. See Kaplan, Financing Long-Term Care in the United States, supra note 64, at 77 
(giving extended example illustrating the minimal tax benefit from purchasing long-term 
care insurance). 
78. See Long-Term Care and Retirement Security Act of 2001, H.R 831, S. 627, 107th 
Cong. § 2(c)(1).; see also Improving Access to Long-Term Care Act of 2002, H.R 4946, 
107th Cong. § 2. 
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thirty-two million retirees, seven million surviving spouses and minor 
children, and another . seven million disabled Arhericans.7 9  It functions 
as a combination retirement annuity, life-insurance policy, and 
disability coverage.80 Income inequality in this country would be even 
worse than Phillips documents if Social Security did not exist. 
Yet, this ubiquitous program is under attack precisely because of 
the conditions that Phillips describes, especially the impact of concen­
trated wealth on the democratic process. President George W. Bush 
campaigned on the issue of "privatizing" Social Security and created a 
presidential commission charged with implementing that goal.81 . 
But this issue first rose to political awareness in the presidential 
campaign of Malcolm Stevenson ("Steve") Forbes III in 1996. This 
personal embodiment of Phillips's thesis of concentrated wealth 
distorting the political· agenda assailed Social Security by claiming that 
folks could do better investing the money themselves.82 As I have 
explained elsewhere,83 this is one of the most enduring myths 
surrounding Social Security, one that fails to consider the full range of 
benefits it provides to a variety of recipients in a multitude of circum­
stances. 
But one aspect of the Forbes critique sticks: Social Security's effort 
to reduce income inequalities translates into less-impressive benefits 
for those who are more financially secure.84 Usually, the issue is not 
presented quite this starkly, but that is the crux of the privatizers' 
complaint - namely, that Social Security reduces Americans' income 
disparities, and some folks do not like being part of that process. 
To understand this phenomenon even superficially, a simplified 
example is necessary. Consider two workers, Ashlie and Sean, both of 
whom have worked in employment covered by Social Security's tax 
regime85 and are now entitled to retirement benefits. Assume further 
that the average monthly earnings, indexed for inflation according to 
Social Security's somewhat convoluted methodology,86 are $5,000 for 
79. Social Security Online, Social Security Beneficiary Statistics, http://www.ssa.gov/ 
OACT/STATS/OASD!benies.html (last updated Dec. 17, 2002). 
80. See generally FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 40, at 273-319. 
81. See REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION, STRENGTHENING SOCIAL 
SECURITY AND CREATING PERSONAL WEALTH FOR ALL AMERICANS (2001), available at 
http://csss.gov/reports/Final_report.pdf (last visited Jan. 1 1 ,  2002). 
82. See Christopher Georges, Forbes's Proposal to Restructure Social Security Suggests 
System Is No Longer Political Third Rail, WALL ST. J. , Feb. 9, 1996, at A14. 
83. Richard L. Kaplan, Top Ten Myths of Social Security, 3 ELDER L.J. 191, 205-08 
(1995). 
84. See id. at 200-02. 
85. See I.RC. §§ 3101(a)-(b), 3111(a)-(b), 312l (a)-(b) (2000); see also FROLIK & 
KAPLAN, supra note 40, at 278-81 (explaining covered employment). 
86. See FROLIK & KAPLAN, supra note 40, at 288-89. 
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Ashlie and $2,500 for Sean. No doubt, Ashlie would expect that her 
retirement benefit will be twice that of Sean's, since her average 
earnings are twice his. 
In many private pension systems, such proportionality would 
indeed be the rule, but Social Security calculates its retirement benefit 
by applying a three-part formula to a retiree's average lifetime 
earnings.87 This formula is 90%-32%-15%, and the "bend points," or 
bracket parameters (in 2003), are $606 and $3,653.88 So, for Ashlie, her 
Social Security benefit is 90% of the first $606 of her average monthly 
earnings, plus 32 % of the amount between the two "bend points" 
($3,653 less $606 equals $3,047), plus 15% of her average monthly 
earnings beyond the second "bend point" ($5,000 less $3,653 equals 
$1,347). The result is a retirement benefit, or Primary Insurance 
Amount ("PIA") in Social Security's terminology, of $1,725. In similar 
fashion, Sean's PIA is 90% of the first $606 of his average monthly 
wages, plus 32% of his remaining wages ($2,500 less $606 equals 
$1,894), since his average earnings did not exceed the second "bend 
point." His PIA, therefore, is $1,151. 
Stripped of the arithmetic, the bottom line is as follows: 
Recipient Average Wage Benefit 
Ashlie $5,000 $1,725 
Sean $2,500 $1,151 
Clearly, Ashlie receives a larger benefit from Social Security than does 
Sean, but her benefit is not twice as large as his (i.e., $1,151 times 2 
equals $2,302), even though her . average monthly earnings are 
precisely twice his. In this manner, Social. Security provides a propor­
tionately larger benefit to the lower-income recipient, Sean in this 
case. As a consequence, Social Security's retirement benefit calcula­
tion mollifies the income disparity between higher- and lower-earning 
workers to some degree. And therein lies the rub. 
If the Social Security program were privatized, even in part, the 
benefit-calculation methodology illustrated above would necessarily 
change. In place of these guaranteed and bottom-weighted benefits, 
affected workers would be exposed to the vicissitudes of the financial 
markets. In all likelihood, lower-income recipients would do less well 
than their higher-income counterparts in navigating the shoals of these 
markets.89 The end result of Social Security privatization, therefore, 
87. See id. at 286-87. 
88. See Social Security Online, Table of Automatic Increases, http://www.ssa.gov/ 
OACT/COLA/autoAdj .html (last updated Oct. 18, 2002). 
89. See Kathryn L. Moore, Partial Privatization of Social Security: Assessing Its Effect on 
Women, Minorities, and Lower-Income Workers, 65 Mo. L. REV. 341 (2000). See generally 
JOHN MUELLER, NAT'L COMM'N TO PRES. SOC. SEC., WINNERS AND LOSERS FROM 
"PRIVATIZING" SOCIAL SECURITY (1999). 
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would be more inequality of income for recipients, not less -
precisely the opposite of what Phillips contends is needed at this point 
in America's history. 
Ill. CONCLUSION 
Kevin Phillips has written an important book in Wealth and 
Democracy, one that should give serious pause to lawmakers involved 
in a wide range of critical issues facing America today. As he notes, 
the increasing economic inequality of recent decades poses a signifi­
cant challenge to the U.S. legal system and its democratic processes. 
He contends that the status quo is "unsustainable" and that plutocracy 
is where we are headed, if we are not already there (p. 422). 
What the future holds is not particularly heartening. Repealing the 
estate tax, creating retirement funding and education incentives that 
primarily benefit financial elites, rejecting universal health insurance, 
ignoring the "silent" crisis90 represented by the costs of long-term care, 
and eliminating the redistributionist aspects of Social Security via 
"privatization" - all of these developments point toward more 
economic inequality, not less. One of Phillips's final chapters begins 
with the observation of historian Arnold Toynbee that "what was 
common to twenty-one past civilizations that had failed" was 
" 'concentrated ownership' and the inflexibility of elites in dealing 
with it" (p. 373). Yet, President Bush championed his program of tax 
cuts with the slogan, "It's not the government's money, it's yours." 
Obviously, a different message is needed if economic inequality is to 
be arrested and democratic vibrancy restored. Bravo to Kevin Phillips 
for setting out the path for those who are not too blind to see it. 
90. See Kaplan, Financing Long-Term Care in the United States, supra note 64, at 65. 
